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INDUSTRIAL COURTS
INDUSTRIAL COURTS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE KANSAS EXPERIMENT'
By J. S..YOUNG*
2. Involuntary Servitude.-Section 17 of the Kansas act
creating a court of industrial relations for the settlement of dis-
putes between employers and employees in the industries affected
with public interest makes it unlawful for any employee or other
person wilfully to strike or picket any of the specified indus-
tries, etc., for the purpose of hindering, delaying, interfering
with or suspending their operation.
In the debate between Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the
American Federation of Labor, and Governor Henry J. Allen of
Kansas at Carnegie Hall, May 28, 1920, the former contended
that section 17 is an abridgment of a person's right to quit work
and therefore constitutes involuntary servitude, which is pro-
hibited by the thirteenth amendment; that the right to strike has
been the chief weapon of labor unions in bettering the conditions
of working men; that denying the use of this right compels
woikkmen to labor against their will, which is involuntary servi-
tude.2  Governor Allen replying contended that the point in-
volved is not the right of men to quit work, but the coercive
power of unions to compel them to quit work against their own
will. He said the object of the Kansas act is not to prohibit a
single individual from quitting work, but to prevent a conspiracy
to quit work for the purpose of injuring an industry whose con-
tinuous operation is imperative for furnishing the.necessaries of
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
1 Continued from 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 185; also 4 MINNESOTA
LAW REviEw 483 and 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 39.
2 Gompers-Allen Debate, p. 9 et seq.
For judicial definition and discussion of slavery and involuntary servi-
tude see Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835; Slaughter
House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36; Plessy v. Ferguson, (1896)
163 U. S. 537, 16 S. C. R. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256; Hodges v. United States,
(1906) 203 U. S. 1, 27 S. C. R. 6, 51 L. Ed. 65; Robertson v. Baldwin,
(1897) 165 U. S. 275, 17 S. C. R. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715; Patterson v. The
Eudora, (1903) 190 U. S. 169, 23 S. C. R. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002; In Re
Dassler, (1886) 35 Kan. 678, 12 Pac. 130; Bailey v. Alabama, (1911) 219
U. S. 219, 315, 55 L. Ed. 191; Arthur v. Oakes, (1894) 63 Fed. 310, 25
L R. A. 419; United States v. Sugar, (1917) 243 Fed. 423; Story v.
Perkins, (1917) 243 Fed. 997; Arver v. United States, (1918) 245 U. S.
366, 62 L. Ed. 352, 38 S. C. 159.
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life to the people of the state. He then lut to Mr. Gompers
the following question which brings into striking relief the public
aspect of the whole matter :3
"When a dispute between capital and labor brings on a strike
affecting the production or distribution of the necessaries of life,
thus threatening the public peace and impairing the public health,
has the public any right in such a controversy, or is it a private
war between capital and labor ?'
Mr. Gompers did not attempt an answer to this question at
the time of the debate, saying he hoped to live long enough to
answer it; but there was so much unfavorable newspaper com-
ment concerning his attitude in the matter that he attempted an
answer a few days later, maintaining that in case of an industrial
dispute between capital and labor there is no disinterested public;
that is, there are only two classes of persons, namely, capitalists
and their sympathizers and workers and their sympathizers. Of
course, everyone knows this is no answer. It is an evasion. It is
common knowledge that in an industrial dispute which involves
a lockout or strike there are three parties-the employers, the
employees and the public.4 The latter are not directly concerned
in the controversy but suffer in at least two ways: (1) by in-
convenience and deprivation while the contest lasts; (2) by being
compelled later to pay the bill when the controversy is settled.
Section 17 safeguards the rights of the individual to quit
work as follows:
"That nothing in this act shall be construed as restricting the
right of an individual employee engaged in the operation of any
such industry, [etc.] to quit his employment at any time." 5
In the brief6 of Mr. Redmond S. Brennan, counsel for Howat
before the supreme court of Kansas, the contention is made that
this provision protects the rights of the floating laborer, but
overlooks the rights of a-resident of the state who has family ties
and interests which make him a part and parcel of the commu-
nity; that the force of circumstances makes it impossible for the
3 Gompers-Allen Debate, p. 36 et seq.
4 Professor Alvin Hansen, of the University of Minnesota, estimates
the .proportions as follows in 1910: Capital, 13.8 per cent; labor 38.2 per
cent; public, 41.9 per cent; unclassified, 6 per cent. See Quarterly Publi-
cations of American Statistical Society, December, 1920. Governor Allen
of Kansas estimates that in a particular controversy the proportions are,
the public, 90 per cent; capital and labor combined, 10 per cent. Saturday
Evening Post, March .1920, p. 6.
5 Laws of 1920; Chap. 29, Sec. 9.
6 See Brief of Redmond S. Brennan, p. 37.
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latter to quit his work, finally, because there is a determinism in
industry that binds the laborer as inexorably as the slave of old
was bound to his oar in the galley; that the training and skill
he has acquired relate him to one job and to one -alone, not
through choice but force of circumstances; that he cannot go out-
side his industry, but must continue in his present employment
and accept such wages and working conditions as he may there
obtain; that the only thing wthich differentiates him from the
slave is his liberty of contract concerning wages, hours and work-
ing conditions; that the right to strike is a part of the liberty
of contract and when this right is taken away the liberty of con-
tract is destroyed and the laborer is reduced to involuntary servi-
tude.
This is a gloomy medieval view to take in the midst of twen-
tieth century opportunities in the United States. The statements
made by Mr. Gompers and Mr. Brennan overlook the provision
of the law which scrupulously safeguards the right of every per-
son "to make his own choice of employment and to make and
carry out fair, just and reasonable contracts and agreements"
and the section set out above which expressly declares that noth-
ing contained in it shall be construed as restricting the right of
an individual employer engaged in the operation of. any such
industry to quit his employment at any time.
The proponents 7 of the Kansas act contend that section 17
enacts into law what courts of equity have been doing already by
restraining conspiracies. It was held in the case of Hitchman
Coal and Coke Company v. Mitchell,' by Justice Pitney, as fol-
lows:
"The right [to form unions and have third parties such as
officers of labor unions] is not so absolute that it may be exer-
cised under any circumstances; whereas in truth like other rights
that exist in civilized society, it must always be exercised with
reasonable regard for the conflicting rights of others."
In a note to Beckinan v. Marsters,9 by Justice Loring, the
following is found:
"Injunction will also be granted to restrain the representative
of a labor union from attempting to induce apprentices to violate
7See brief of Messrs. R. J. Hopkins, A. B. Keller and F. S.-Jackson,
counsel for the state in the Howat case, p. 12.
8 (1917) 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. Ed. 260.
9 (1907) 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 202. See Flacus v. Smith, (1901) 199
Penn. 128, 133, 54 L. R. A. 640, 85 A. S. R. 779, 48 Atl. 894. See Enter-
prise Foundry Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, (1907) 149 Mich. 31, 112
N. W. 685.
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the contract of apprenticeship [in which they agreed not to join
labor unions] by joining his labor union."
Also,
"It has long been settled that interference with labor con-
tracts by inducing laborers to break their contracts of employ-
ment would be restrained by injunction. In fact it was to pro-
tect such contracts as this that the aid of equity was first in-
voked."
Furthermore, conspiracies that have for their object the bet-
terment of the conditions of the workmen may be restrained by
injunctive process if the conspiracy would result in a breach of
the law.10 This same point was discussed in the case of Toledo,
etc., Co. v. Penn. Co.,"' by Judge Taft, in the following words:
"While an employee may bestow or withhold his labor as he
will, if he uses the benefit which his labor is or will be to another
by threatening to withhold or agreeing to bestow it, or by actu-
ally withholding it, or bestowing it for the purpose of enforcing,
procuring or compelling that other to commit an unlawful act,
such withholding or bestowing of labor is itself an unlawful
and criminal act."
Justice Blatchford, speaking for the Supreme Court in the
case of Joy v. St. Louis," said:
"It is one of the most useful functions of the court of equity
that its methods of procedure are capable of being made such as
to accommodate themselves to the development of the interests
of the public in the progress of trade and traffic by new methods
of intercourse and transportation."
If a court of equity can restrain employees from violation and
intimidation and from enforcing rules of labor unions which re-
sult in irremediable injuries to their employers and the public,
does not the legislature likewise have the power to define and
prescribe rules to protect the public in similar circumstances?
The contention of the opponents of the Kansas act that section
17 re-establishes involuntary servitude is not sound because (1)
there is no economic duress in our land of opportunity and mo-
bility of labor; (2) the law carefully safeguards the right of the
individual to make his own choice of labor and carry out fair,
just and reasonable contracts and agreements of employment and
to quit his employment at any time, provided he does not con-
spire with others for the purpose of hindering the operation of
an essential industry. The law does not attempt to compel any
10 See In re Debs, (1894) 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092.
11 (1893) 19 L. R. A. 387.
12 (1890) 138 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 843, 11 S. C. R. 243.
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person to work against his will; therefore, there is no involun-
tary servitude.
3. The "Closed Shop" and the Obligation of Contracts.-
Section 9 empowers the court of industrial relations to modify
contracts of employment in the industries affected with a public
interest so that they shall be and remain fair, just and reasonable,
"if, during the continuance of any such employment the terms
or conditions of any such contract or agreement, hereafter entered
into, are by said court, in any action or proceeding properly be-
fore it under the provisions of this act found to be unfair, un-
just and unreasonable."
The union labor officials claim that this section is a blow
aimed at the "closed shop" because the court would be empowered
to prevent, and in case of any dangerous controversies between
employer and employee, could make it impossible for the unions
to enforce a contract with their employers, requiring them to
use union laborers only. In other words, their contention is that
section 9 will make it impossible to maintain the "closed shop" in
the state. No one denies that laborers may join and maintain
labor unions for lawful purposes which include the right to bar-
gain collectively; but the right to contract is not absolute either
for individuals or labor unions. The Supreme Court in Gompers
v. Buck's Stove and Range Co.,"3 by Justice Lamar, said:
. "Society itself is an organization, and does not object to or-
ganizations for social, religious, business and all legal purposes.
The law, therefore, recognizes the right of workmen to unite
and to invite others to join their ranks, thereby making available
the strength, influence and power that come from such associa-
tion. By virtue of this right powerful labor unions have been
organized.
"But the very fact that it is lawful to form these bodies with
multitudes of members, means that they have thereby acquired a
vast power, in the presence of which the individual may be help-
less. This power, when unlawfully used against one, cannot be
met, except by his purchasing peace at the cost of submitting to
terms which involve the sacrifice of rights protected by the con-
stitution; or by standing on such rights, and appealing to the pre-
ventive powers of a court of equity. When such appeal is made
it is the duty of the government to protect one against the many
as well as the many against the one."
The labor unions make much of the Adair
14 and Coppage15
cases which emphasized the right of the employer to maintain
13 (1910) 221 U. S. 439, 55 L. Ed. 805.
14 Adair v. United States, (1908) 208 ,U. S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 436, 13
Ann. Cas. 764.
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the "open shop." They maintain. that the unions have the same
right to insist on the "closed shop." In other words, they argue
that the whole matter should be subject to contract between em-
ployer and employee and that section 9 limits this contractual
right. This contention is tenable so far as the public interest is
not involved. The decision in the Coppage case declared that the
fourteenth amendment bars the states from striking down per-
sonal liberty or property rights, or materially restricting their
normal exercise, "excepting so far as may be incidentally neces-
sary for the accomplishment of some other or paramount ob-
ject, and one that concerns the public welfare." Section 9 is
grounded on this exception. The state of Kansas has declared
by legislative act that contracts between employers and employees
which hinder or prevent the operation of the industries, etc.,
affected with a public interest, are subversive of public right
and may be modified by the court of industrial relations to make
them conform to the public interest. The pronouncement of
Chief Justice White in the case of Wilson v. New'6 is the latest
word of the Supreme Court touching this point. The Chief
Justice said:
"Here again it is obvious that what we have previously said
is applicable and decisive, since whatever would be the right of
an employee engaged in private business to demand such wages
as he desires, to leave the employment if he does not get them,
and by concert of action, to agree with others to leave upon the
same condition, such rights are necessarily subject to limitation
when employment is accepted in a business charged with a public
interest and as to which the power to regulate commerce pos-
sessed by Congress applied, and the resulting right to fix, in
case of disagreement and dispute, a standard of wages, as we
have seen necessarily obtained. In other words, considering com-
prehensively the situation of the employer and the employee in
the light of the obligations arising from the public interest and
of the work in which they are engaged, and the degree of regula-
tion which may be lawfully asserted by Congress as to that busi-
ness, it must follow that the exercise of the lawful governmental
right is controlling."
Justice McKenna in a coricurring opinion said:
"When one enters into interstate commerce, one enters into a
service in which the public has an interest, and subjects one's
self to its behests. And this is no limitation of liberty; it is the
consequence of liberty exercised, the obligation of his under-
'1 Coppage v. Kansas, (1914) 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. Ed. 441, 35 S. C. R.
240.
16 (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755, 37 S. C. R. 298.
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taking, and constrains no more than any contract constrains.
The obligation of a contract is the law under which it is made,
and submission to regulation is the condition which attaches to
one who enters into or accepts employment in a business in which
the public has an interest."
The employer may contract to maintain the "open shop" and
the unions may contract to maintain the "closed shop" but the ex-
ception quoted from the Coppage case and whole tenor of the
Wilson v. New case uphold the power of the legislature to mod-
ify both classes of contracts under the police power, in order to
preserve peace, order and safety and promote the general wel-
fare of the public.
Mr. Brennan's brief1" contends that section 23 is unconsti-
tutional because it impairs the obligation of the contract. 8 The
section in question provides that the orders of the court of in-
dustrial relations as to minimum or standard of wages are to be
deemed prima facie as reasonable and just and such minimum
wage takes effect as of the time the investigation by the court
began, not when the order is made, and either party to the contro-
versy having a balance due on account of the minimum wage fixed
may sue for it in any court of competent jurisdiction. The con-
tention is that the retroaction from the date of the order to the
beginning of the investigation works the impairment. The opin-
ion of the writer is that this section is unwise, unworkable and
should be repealed; but it does not imlpair the obligation of the
contract. It would be an impairment if applied to a contract
made before the law was passed. Section 9 specifically states
that the law shall apply "to such contract or agreement hereafter
entered into." It is a well known principle that all contracts made
7 See Mr. Brennan's brief, p. 46.
18 See 6 1 C. L. "Obligations of Contracts," secs. 314-15 and cases
cited. For additional cases on. impairment of obligation of contracts, see
New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., (1888)
125 U. S. 18, 8 S. C. R. 741, 31 L. Ed. 607; Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629; Odgen v.
Saunders, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 213, 6 L. Ed. 606; Von Hoffman v.
City of Quincy, (1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 535, 18 L. Ed. 403; Fletcher v.
Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; -Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, (1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 420, 9 L. Ed. 733; Rochester Ry. Co. v.
Rochester, (1907) 205 U. S. 236, 51 L. Ed. 784, 27 S. C. R. 469; Coving-
ton v. Kentucky, (1899) 173 U. S. 231, 43 L. Ed. 679, 19 S. C. R. 383;
Greenwood v. Freight Co., (1881) 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. Ed. 961; Beer Co.
v. Massachusetts, (1877) 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989; Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park, (1878) 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. Ed. 1036; Stone v. Mississippi,
(1879) 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079; New Orleans Gas. Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., (1885) 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. Ed. 516; Illinois -Central R. Co. v.
Illinois, (1892) 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. Ed. 1018, 13 S. C. R. 110.
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after the passage of a law are made in view of and are subject
to the existing law; therefore, section 9 does not impair the obli-
gation of the contract.
4. Relation of the Act to Interstate Commerce.-The con-
stitutionality of the Kansas act has been denied because it places
an unnecessary burden on interstate commerce and conflicts with
federal legislation passed in conformity with the interstate com-
merce clause of the constitution. This objection was raised be-
fore the court of industrial relations in the case of Wendele v.
Union Pacific R. Co. 9 Wendele, as vice-president of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen and Oilers, filed a
complaint touching the wage situation and asked the court to take
jurisdiction, fix a minimum wage, and prescribe reasonable rules
and regulations in the premises. Counsel for the railroads de-
nied the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the railroads
were engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore, come under
the act of Congress, approved February 28, 1920, known as "The
transportation act of 1920" which provides means for the settle-
ment of such disputes as were involved in the case. Judge Hug-
gins delivered the opinion of the court and on taking jurisdic-
tion of the case said the evidence showed that while the mem-
bers of the local unions are not "road men" and have nothing to
do directly with the operation of trains, they are engaged in
work which directly affects the operation of trains in both intra-
state and interstate commerce; that the work of the unions is
all done within the state of Kansas and by residents of the state;
that the wage of the workers is unreasonably low especially for
men with families to support. Touching the legal objections raised
by counsel for the railroads, the court said: The tenth amend-
ment reserves the "police powers" to the state and upon this re-
serve power the Kansas act was passed to protect and defend
the comfort, well-being, property, health, morals and safety of
the people of the state of Kansas. The court pointed out that
section 6 declares that certain industries including railroads must
be operated with reasonable continuity to the end that the people
may be supplied with the necessaries of life; also, that section 9
declares that workers engaged in certain industries including
railroads must be paid a fair wage and have healthful and moral
surroundings while engaged in such labor; the court then quoted
19 (1920) Kansas industrial court, Docket No. 3293. Printed transcript.
.360
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with approval the words used by Justice Hughes in the case of
Simpson v. Shepard20 as follows :
"It is competent for a state to govern its internal commerce,
to provide legal means to create and regulate local facilities, to
adopt protective measures of a reasonable character in the inter-
est of the health, safety, morals and welfare of its people, al-
though interstate commerce may incidentally or indirectly be
involved."
The court then added:
"Of course in matters requiring uniform national regulations,
when Congress acts, the states would be prevented from enacting
legislation which might in any way disturb the national regula-
tions. The national government is paramount but in the absence
of federal legislation prohibiting the same, there may be a great
variety of state regulations indirectly affecting interstate com-
merce."
The same point of view is upheld by the Supreme Court in the
case of Hemzington v. Georgia,2' by Justice Harlan, as follows:
"The legislative enactment of the states passed under the ad-
mitted police powers and having a real relation to the domestic
peace, order, health and safety of the people, but which, by
their necessary operation, affect to some extent, or for a limited
time, the conduct of commerce among the states, are yet not in-
valid by force alone of the grant of power to regulate such com-
merce; and if not obnoxious to some other constitutional pro-
vision or destruction of some right secured by the fundamental
law, are to be respected in the courts of the union until they are
superseded and displaced by some act of Congress passed in exe-
cution of powers granted to it by the constitution."
The following local police power measures have been upheld
although they affected interstate commerce: an ordinance of the
city of Chicago requiring bridges over the navigable Chicago
River to be kept closed during the rush hours of the day except
for ten minute intervals ;22 requiring locomotive engineers to be
examined and licensed by state authorities2 3 and take tests from
time to time with respect to their ability to distinguish colors 
;24
preventing the running of freight trains on Sunday ;25 forbidding
20 (1912) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 S. C. R. 729.
21 (1896) 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. Ed. 166, 16 S. C. R. 1086.
22 (1882) Escanaba, etc., Co. v. Chicago, (1882) 107 U. S. 678, 27 L.
Ed. 442, 2 S. C. R. 185.
23 Smith v. Alabama, (1888) 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508, 8 S. C. R.
564.
24 Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Alabama, (1888) 128 U. S. 96, 32 L. Ed.
352, 9 S. C. R. 28.
25 Hennington v. Georgia, (1896) 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. Ed. 166, 16
S. C. 1086.
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the consolidation *of parallel or competing railway lines ;26 re-
quiring railroad companies to fix rates annually and post them
in printed form at their railway stations ;27 compelling a special
system of heating cars ;28 making void an agreement by which a
common carrier seeks to relieve himseff of common law liability
Tor accidents happening within the state, although the transporta-
tion is interstate ;29 specifying a special form of contract to ex-
empt the carrier from liability for shipments beyond the line of
the carrier receiving the consignment ;30 requiring telegraph com-
panies to receive dispatches and to transmit and deliver them with
due diligence as applied to messages from outside the state.3 All
these regulations affected interstate commerce, but in the opinion
of the Supreme Court they did not unreasonably burden interstate
commerce. These state regulations may be superseded at any
time Congress sees fit to-occupy the field with legislation.
The court of industrial relations denied that granting the
relief sought by Wendele and the local unions represented by him
would directly burden interstate commerce and said:
"If the wages fixed by this court should be unreasonably high
the payment of such wages by the respondents might place an un-just burden upon interstate commerce; but if the wages fixed by
this court be reasonable, and if the rules and regulations pre-
scribed be fair, then no injury could come to, and no unneces-
sary burden could be imposed upon interstate commerce, but on
the contrary interstate commerce would be benefited by the action
of this court in the premises. There is no presumption that this
court will fix a wage or establish rules and regulations so un-
fair as to place an unjust burden upon interstate commerce. The
presumption is to the contrary."
The court then pointed out that the transportation act of 1920
gives the federal labor board power and authority to investigate,
determine and make findings .of fact touching disputes and pub-
lish the same, but the board has no authority to enforce any find-
ings of the adjustment boards; therefore, there is no conflict
26 Louisiana & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky, (1896) 161 U. S. 677,
40 L. Ed. 849, 16 S. C. R. 714.27Railroad Co. v. Fuller, (1873) 17 Wall. 560, 21 L. Ed. 710, 154
I, S. 595.
28 New York Central R. Co. v. New York, (1897) 165 U. S. 628, 41
L. Ed. 853, 17 S. C. R. 418.29 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Solan, (1898) 169 U. S.
133, 42 L. Ed. 688, 18 S. C. R. 289.30 Richmond & Alleghany R. Co. v. Patterson . Tobacco Co., (1898)
169 U. S. 311, 42 L. Ed. 759, 18 S. C. R. 335.
31 Western Union Telegraph -Co. v. James, (1896) 162 U. S. 650, 40
L. Ed. 1105, 16 S. C. R. 934.
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between the federal law and the Kansas law. But, continued
the court:
"Let us assume that in this action the court of industrial re-
lations should make findings of fact and issue an order estab-
lishing a minimum wage for the complainants in advance of the
wage now paid. Now, let us assume that, as contended by the
respondents, the matter is already before the federal labor board,
and suppose thirty or sixty days after the issuance of an order
by the court of industrial relations the federal labor board should
hand down an arbitration award fixing a minimum wage either
higher or lower than that fixed by the court of industrial rela-
tions. The award would be a nullity unless accepted by both par-
ties. There is nothing in the Kansas'law to prevent the parties
from agreeing to accept the federal labor board's award and com-
ing into this court and asking this court to approve the same."
The court then quoted section 8 of the Kansas law which
reads as follows:
"Such terms, conditions, rules, practices, wages or standard
of wages so fixed and determined by said court and stated in said
orders shall continue for such reasonable time as may be fixed
by said court, or until changed by agreement of the parties with-
the approval of the court."
The court then continued:
"It will be seen, therefore, that no matter by what means or
in what way the complainants and respondents agree, whether
by the aid of the federal labor board or by private negotiations,
whenever they agree, if the agreement provides a wage that is
fair to the general public and approved by this court, the order
of this court is automatically suspended and set aside and the
agreement becomes effective. It will, therefore, be seen that the
Kansas law cannot in any way conflict with the federal law, but
may be supplementary to it. There can be no conflict, because
the order made by the court of industrial relations is temporary
in its nature, is intended only to be enforceable until the parties
may agree, and is provided for the protection of the general pub-
lic against the inconvenience, hardships and suffering which so
often follow in the wake of industrial warfare. It cannot be pre-
sumed in advance that the -federal labor board will render an
award which will be unfair to the public. It cannot be presumed
at this time that there ever will be any conflict between the Kan-
sas law and the federal law."
In reply to the contention that Congress has acted on the mat-
ter by creating the interstate commerce commission and that this
prohibits state action which even indirectly affects interstate com-
merce, the court quoted from the Supreme Court in the case of Mo.
Pacific R. Co. v. Larrabee Mills3 2 by Justice Brewer who said:
32 (1908) 211 U. S. 612, 53 L. Ed. 352, 29 S. C. R. 214.
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"The mere grant by Congress to the commission of certain
national powers in respect to interstate commerce does not of
itself and in the absence of action by the commission interfere
with the authority of the state to make those regulations 'con-
ducive to the welfare and convenience of its citizens."
It is, therefore, clear that the Kansas act does not directly
or unnecessarily burden interstate commerce.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The first article of this series 33 gave the steps leading to
the passage of the Kansas act for the settlement. of industrial
disputes; set forth the leading provisions of the law; stated the
arguments for and against the bill as it was discussed at the spe-
cial session of the Kansas legislature; and detailed some of the
early' activities of the new Kansas court of industrial relations.
The second article" treated the act in relation to the Kansas
constitution, examining the power of the governor to call a spe-
cial session of the legislature, the sufficiency of the title of the
act and the revival of a law by amendment, and commingling the
functions of the three great departments of the government. The
third article35 examined the Kansas act as a police power meas-
ure and the federal constitutional limitations by which its valid-
ity must be tested.
The writer has attempted to discuss the act not from the
social or the economic point of view except incidentally, but from
the constitutional, applying adjudicated cases to the controverted
phases of the law. From the standpoint of expressing the ap-
parent object of the legislature, the law is exceedingly well drawn.
For the most part the content is clear and unmistakable; the act
is undoubtedly patterned after the Adamson Railroad law of
1916. In the opinion of the writer section 23 is unwise, un-
workable and should be repealed or amended; section 12 is capa-
ble of at least three different constructions and should be simpli-
fied; section 9 seems to fall under the condemnation of the
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in the Adair and Cop-
page cases; section 20 authorizes state socialism in certain cir-
cumstances and may infringe the fourteenth amendment by tak-
ing property without due process of law; but the act is so well
drawn as to be reasonably sure of being held constitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Part of the act may be
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declared unconstitutional and the other parts remain intact. Sec-
tion 28 provides:
"If any section or provision of this act shall be found in-
valid by any court, it shall be conclusively presumed that this
act would have been passed by the legislature without such' in-
valid section or provision, and the act as a whole shall not be de-
clared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more sections or
provisions may be found to be invalid by any court."
Kansas has played the role of path-finder in the past. Her
prohibition amendment furnished a model for other states and
finally for the national eighteenth amendment. Her "blue-sky"
law is rapidly spreading to other states. Her latest law for the
settlement of industrial disputes may place this state in the lead
again by furnishing a method for determining industrial justice
and thereby accomplishing a large measure of social justice.
The act is predicated on the theory that no group in a strategic
economic position shall be allowed to oppress society; that neither
organized employers nor organized laborers shall dominate or-
ganized society; that neither employers' lockouts nor laborers'
strikes shall take the place of well-ordered government by the
ballot; that adjudication by a permanent impartial court is su-
perior to arbitration by a temporary bi-partisan committee with
the addition of a supposedly impartial umpire; that economic
waste shall be reduced to the minimum; that the people of the
state shall have a steady supply of the necessaries of life.
The act affects with a public interest the operation of three
new industries, namely, the manufacture of food, clothing and
the mining or production of fuel, together with the transporta-
tion of these three, and provides that controversies between em-
ployers and employees in these industries which threaten public
rights come under the control of the court of industrial relations;
legalizes collective bargaining; regulates the lessening or cessation
of production in the essential industries; prohibits strikes; pro-
vides for the establishment of a minimum wage and good work-
ing conditions for all workers; makes unlawful certain activities
that interfere with the operation of the essential industries; and
finally, provides adequate penalties for the enforcement of the
law.
The Kansas court of industrial relations has been in opera-
tion one year. In addition to numerous small and two general
investigations, the court has 'heard and rendered decisions in
twenty-five cases filed by labor and one filed by capital. In all
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these cases except one there was neither law nor precedent to guide
the court. The new questions presented had to be reasoned out
along untried and original lines. Perhaps this new court of in-
dustrial relations with red-tape cut and slow, cumbrous proce-
dure eliminated is formulating in a quiet and unostentatious man-
ner a new phase of industrial common law which later will find
enactment in a much-needed industrial code which will make a
large contribution to the establishment of industrial peace.
